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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Is the seventy (70) acres of unimproved land, which is owned 
by the Utah Transit Authority (UTA) contiguous to its bus garage 
and administrative o f f i c e s , and held for future expansion of UTA, 
exempt from ad valorem property taxation? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1969 the Utah Legislature passed the Utah Public Transit 
District Act, Sections 1 1 - 2 0 - 1 , et» seq», Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, and U.C.A. Section 11-20-2 set forth the 
concerns of the Legislature in adopting those provisions, and it 
stated : 
The legislature hereby finds and declares: 
(1) That the predominant part of the state's 
population is located in its rapidly expanding 
metropolitan and other urban areas which generally cross 
the boundary lines of local jurisdictions and often 
extend into two or more counties; 
(2) That usage of present public urban transit 
systems has been declining while cost of operation has 
been increasing, so that present public transit systems 
have been forced to curtail services rendered, and their 
plans and equipment have been deteriorating with the 
result that they are unable to provide the type of 
service needed by citizens and are unable to plan, 
establish and co-ordinate area-wide metropolitan public 
transit systems; 
(3) That the welfare and vitality of urban areas, 
the satisfactory movement of people within these areas, 
the lessening of traffic congestion and the 
effectiveness of housing, tourist, highway and other 
governmental p r o g r a m s , are being jeopardized thereby; 
and 
(4) That the problems involved in adequately 
furnishing public urban transportation for the present 
and future needs of the people of the state are of such 
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magnitude and complexity that the various urban transit 
s y s t e m s , m u n i c i p a l i t i e s and counties acting 
individually, lack the ability, finances and 
jurisdiction to resolve, establish and co-ordinate urban 
transportati o n . 
T h e r e f o r e , it is essential to establish a public 
agency known as a transit district which can operate in 
its own right and authority and exercise jurisdiction 
without being restricted to municipal corporate or 
county 1imits, governed by representatives of the 
governmental unit lying within the d i s t r i c t . It is the 
purpose of this act to provide the means necessary for 
mass transportation of person presently and in the 
f u t u r e . (Emphasis added) 
The Legislature then added, in U.C.A. Section 1 1 - 2 0 - 3 : 
"This act shall be liberally construed to carry out 
the object and purposes and the declared policy of the 
state of Utah as in this act set forth.'1 
In response to the legislative mandate contained in the Utah 
Public Transit District Act, the Utah Transit Authority, 
hereinafter referred to as "UTA" was established, and is the 
first and largest public transit district in Utah. The UTA 
currently serves the residents of Salt Lake, Davis and Weber 
C o u n t i e s , Provo City, and Orem City, with some allied service to 
Tooele and Box Elder C o u n t i e s . UTA service is presently 
available to approximately seventy five percent (75%) of the 
residents of the State of Utah. 
Public transit districts were given broad general powers 
(U.C.A. Section 11-20-16) but the districts were not given the 
power of eminent d o m a i n . T h e r e f o r e , in the m i d - 1 9 7 0 ' s , when UTA 
outgrew its downtown bus terminal facility it attempted to 
acquire the adjoining property, but without the power of eminent 
domain, it was unsuccessful in its attempt to acquire that 
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property* Then, the UTA acquired two separate options on two 
separate parcels of p r o p e r t y , but was unsuccessful in obtaining 
conditional use permits to construct its needed facilities 
because of the strong objections and hostilities of the local 
n e i g h b o r h o o d s . 
Finally, after substantial searching for the right location, 
and at the urging of the Salt Lake County Commission, on October 
2, 1 9 7 8 , the UTA acquired a parcel of approximately 110 acres at 
approximately 7U0 West and 3600 South in Salt Lake County* The 
parcel of property was large enough for the construction of the 
new bus garage and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e offices on approximately 40 
acres, and still leave sufficient room for anticipated mass 
transit growth and expansion on the remaining parcel* The 
additional land was needed not only to provide for the expansion 
of UTA's bus o p e r a t i o n s , but also to provide a home base for a 
high-speed, light rail system currently being planned by UTA and 
the Wasatch Front Regional C o u n c i l , the metropolitan planning 
organization for the five-county area of Salt Lake, D a v i s , Weber, 
Morgan and Tooele C o u n t i e s * (R* 4 2 - 4 3 , 70, and 8 1 ) . The property 
is located near freeway exits and existing railroad rights-of-
way, and may thus be used for either expansion of the bus 
facilities or for a h i g h - s p e e d , light rail system* 
When construction was commenced on the property, a sewer 
system and main road were installed which will be adequate to 
serve the entire 110 acre p a r c e l , and then four (4) buildings 
were constructed on forty (40) acres to serve as bus g a r a g e , bus 
wash, service facilities and administrative o f f i c e s * The 
-3-
remaining seventy (70) acres of land is being held for future 
expansion of UTA. 
From 1 9 7 0 , the date UTA was organized, until 1 9 8 0 , a period 
of more than ten (10) y e a r s , UTA was considered a totally tax 
exempt entity and was never assessed or taxed by Salt Lake County 
or any other county in the S t a t e . 
In 1 9 8 1 , the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
attempted for the first time to impose an ad valorem tax on UTA 
and held that the vacant seventy (70) acre parcel was subject to 
ad valorem property t a x e s . The Utah State Tax Commission in both 
a formal and informal opinion, overruled that decision and held 
that the property was exempted from taxation by the Utah 
Constitution (R. 0019 to 0 0 2 3 ) . UTA requests that this Court 
affirm the decision of the Tax C o m m i s s i o n . 
The parties have agreed by stipulation that the final 
decision in this case will determine the taxability or exemption 
of the subject property for the years 1981, 1 9 8 2 , 1983 and 1 9 8 4 , 
and because of the passage of time the decision will also 
certainly determine those issues for 1985 and 1 9 8 6 . T h e r e f o r e , 
because the relevant constitutional provision (Article X I I I , 
Section 2, Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n ) was amended effective January 1, 
1983, and further because certain statutory provisions were 
amended and/or repealed effective January 1, 1 9 8 6 , it will be 
necessary in this brief to occasionally differentiate between the 
existing provisions and the former p r o v i s i o n s . However, it is 
respectfully submitted that the changes in those provisions would 
not change the result but would only slightly modify the process 
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of reaching that r e s u l t . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH C O N S T I T U T I O N , ARTICLE XIII, 
SECTION 2 MAKES THE PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM 
AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAX^S 
A. THE UTAH C O N S T I T U T I O N , ARTICLE X I I I , SECTION 2, EXEMPTS 
ALL PROPERTY OF ALL GOVERNMENTAL E N T I T I E S . 
Article X I I I , Section 2 of the Utah Constitution establishes 
the basic requirement that all property within the state must be 
taxed on a uniform b a s i s , and it also establishes the basic 
exemptions from ad valorem property t a x e s . Before January 1, 
1983, the provision requiring taxes was as follows: 
"All tangible property in the state, not exempt 
under the laws of the United States, or under this 
Constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, 
to be ascertained as provided by law." 
Effective January 1, 1 9 8 3 , that provision was amended slightly to 
read: 
" (1) All tangible property in the state, not 
exempt under the laws of the United States, or under 
this C o n s t i t u t i o n , shall be taxed at a uniform and equal 
rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as 
provided by law." 
Both of those provisions require that except for exemptions 
established by Federal law, the only property tax exemptions are 
those which are specifically set forth by the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , 
i.e., that the legislature is prohibited from establishing any 
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additional classifications of property that can legally be exempt 
from ad valorem property taxes. Further, since the Legislature 
may not establish any further exemptions, they likewise may not 
in any way limit or proscribe any exemptions which are 
established by the Utah Constitution. 
Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution then 
establishes the exemptions from ad valorem property taxes, and 
the relevant portions of that section for all periods prior to 
January 1, 1983 provided: 
The property of the state, counties, cities, towns, 
school districts, municipal corporations and public 
libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used 
exclusively for either religious worship or charitable 
purposes, and places of burial not held or used for 
private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from 
taxation. (Emphasis added) 
The relevant portions of that section for periods after 
January 1, 1983 provides: 
(2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(a) The property of the state, school 
districts, and public libraries; 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, 
special districts, and all other political subdivisions 
of the state, except that to the extent and in the 
manner provided by the Legislature the property of a 
county, city, town, special district or other political 
subdivision of the state located outside of its 
geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject 
to the ad valorem property tax; 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity 
which is used exclusively for religious, charitable or 
educational purposes: (Emphasi s added) 
Regarding the former constitutional provision, UTA is 
clearly a "municipal corporation" as that term is used and was 
meant to apply to all other governmental entities. However, in 
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this case it is not necessary to resort to the many varied 
agencies included in the broad definition of "municipal 
corporations." UTA is clearly a public transit district 
established pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Public Transit 
District Act. U.C.A. Sections 1 1 - 2 0 - 1 , et seq. U.C.A. Section 
11 - 2 0 - 5 8 , a portion of that act, specifically makes public 
transit districts subject to the Utah Municipal Bond Act, and 
U.C.A. Section 1 1 - 1 4 - 1 , a part of the Utah Municipal Bond Act 
specifically defines "municipality" to include public transit 
d i s t r i c t s . T h e r e f o r e , it seems clear that the UTA as a public 
transit district is a m u n i c i p a l i t y , and as a municipality it is a 
"municipal corporation" within the meaning of Article X I I I , 
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution and its property is exempted 
by that constitutional provision from ad valorem property taxes 
for all periods prior to January 1, 1983, and the assessments of 
the UTA property for 1981 and 1982 must f a i L 
For all periods after January 1, 1983, (1983, 1 9 8 4 , 1985 and 
1986 taxes) the constitutional provision (Article XIII, Section 
2) specifically exempts "The property of counties, cities, towns, 
special d i s t r i c t s , and all other political subdivisions of the 
state...." It is respectfully submitted that the UTA, as a 
public transit district is clearly a "special district" within 
the meaning of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , and as a municipality under the 
Utah Municipal Bond Act is clearly an "other political 
subdivision" within the meaning of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . Further, 
Section 63-30-2 U.C.A. defines the words "Political subdivision" 
for purposes of the Governmental Immunity Act to include "public 
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transit districts" and "special improvement or taxing districts 
or other governmental subdivisions or public corporations." 
Therefore, it is clear that under both the former and 
present constitutional provisions the properties of the UTA are 
exempt from ad valorem property t a x e s . 
Salt Lake County, in fact, in its brief, seems to accept 
that principal that the properties of the UTA are exempt from 
taxes, because the county has conceded the tax exempt status of 
forty (40) acres of improved property owned by the UTA. If the 
Utah Constitution requires the properties of the UTA to be taxed, 
then neither the county or the state legislature may exempt those 
properties from taxes, but likewise, where the Utah Constitution 
specifically exempts the properties of the UTA from taxes, then 
the county and the state legislature are powerless to attempt to 
impose taxes on any portion of those properties. 
The county is attempting to persuade this Court to interpret 
the constitution to include a "use" test on the tax exemption for 
governmental owned property when the constitution does not 
include any such requirement. A careful analysis of the former 
and present provisions of Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah 
Constitution will show that for individuals or entities claiming 
an exemption from taxes for chartable purposes, the property must 
have been "used exclusively for charitable purposes," and 
therefore the actual "use" of the property must be reviewed. 
However, if the exemption from taxes is claimed by a governmental 
agency then the exemption is based upon the "ownership" of the 
property and not upon the "use" of the property, i.e., for the 
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charitable exemption the criteria for exemption is "use" of the 
property, but for governmental exemptions the criteria is 
"ownership" of the p r o p e r t y . 
These long established principals were first stated by the 
Supreme Court of Utah in 1894 in the case of City of Springville 
v J o h n s o n , 10 Utah 3 5 1 , 37 Pac. 577* In that case, the City of 
Springville had acquired approximately 900 acres of land within 
its corporate l i m i t s . The land was not used for any corporate 
purpose, but was rented for pasturage of cattle from which the 
city derived r e v e n u e . The Court held that the use or non-use of 
the property was not important, but the exemption from taxes was 
based solely upon ownership by the governmental entity* The 
Court in the Springville case stated: 
Appellant's counsel have devoted the greater part 
of their brief in citing authorities on the constriction 
of s t a t u t e s . We do not deem it necessary to devote 
attention to them, for, while they are doubtless good 
law when applied to statutes whose language is 
ambiguous, in this case the exemption from taxation of 
the property of cities is so clear and expressive that 
there would seem to be no room for any doubt, or 
necessity or resorting to any rule of c o n s t r u c t i o n . The 
exemption is a b s o l u t e , and depends upon no condition but 
ownership by the c i t y . RaiI road C o . v . Denni s, 116 U . S . 
665, 6 Sup. Ct. 6 2 5 . (Emphasis added) 
In that case, even though the city owned 900 acres that was 
not being used for any city purpose and for which the city had no 
future needs or p l a n s , the Court refused to review the use or 
non-use of the property and ruled that the exemption depended 
upon no condition but ownership by the c i t y . 
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B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXEMPTION FROM PROPERTY TAXES FOR ALL 
PROPERTY OWNED BY GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES IS SELF-
EXECUTING, AND CANNOT BE MODIFIED, ALTERED, AMENDED OR 
CHANGED BY THE LEGISLATURE. 
Salt Lake County, in its brief submitted to this Court, has 
implied that U.C.A. Section 11-20-55 makes the property of the 
UTA taxable even if the Utah constitution specifically makes the 
property exempt from ad valorem taxes* However, one of the most 
basic and fundamental principles of jurisprudence is that a 
constitutional provision has supremacy over a statutory 
provision, and if there is any conflict between a constitutional 
and a statutory provisions, the constitutional provision must 
govern. 
Legislation is frequently enacted to implement 
constitutional provisions, and in this case U.C.A. Section 59-2-1 
has been enacted to define the property tax exemptions in 
question in this proceeding. However, the statute quotes the 
constitutional provision on a word for word basis, although 
whereas the constitution was amended affective January 1, 1983, 
the statute was not amended at the same time and the effective 
date of the new statute is January 1, 1 9 8 6 . Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that even if the statute had never been enacted or 
amended the property of the UTA would be exempt because of 
Article XIII, Section 2 of the Utah Constitution. 
In state constitutions, provisions which grant powers to 
governmental entities are normally interpreted to be nonself-
executing, and therefore legislation must be enacted before a 
- 1 0 -
governmental entity may implement those powers. However, when a 
state constitution limits the powers of governmental entities 
those limitations are self-execut i ng, and those limitations are 
effective to prohibit the proscribed actions with or without 
further, legislative e n a c t m e n t s . Constitutional provisions may 
also be self-executing if they can be interpreted and go into 
immediate effect without the necessity of any legislation. 
Thus, in referring specifically to Article XIII, Section 2 
of the Utah Constitution, it is submitted that it contains both 
self-executing and nonself-executing p r o v i s i o n s . The portion of 
that provision which requires that all tangible property must be 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate appears to be nonsel f-executing 
because it requires implementing legislation to define the tax 
rate, the assessment rate, the procedures to determine the 
assessment and tax rates, the rights of appeal and many other 
factors before it can be implemented. It is, therefore, nonself-
executing so no taxes may be imposed until authorizing 
legislation is enac t e d . 
On the other hand, the portions of Article XIII, Section 2 
which grant the property tax 
proceeding are limitations on 
they can be fully 
and they can 
and therefore 
go 
, the 
understood wi 
into immediate 
exemptions in q 
the power of the 
uest 
leg 
thout interpretative 
effect without 
> exemption p r o v i s i o n s are self-
any 
ion in this 
islature and 
l e g i s l a t i o n , 
l e g i s l a t i o n , 
•execut i n g . 
These principals have been referred to by the Utah Supreme 
Court in, In Re Montello, Salt Co., 53 P.2d 727,88 Utah 283, 
wherein the Court, quoting other sources stated: 
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Constitutional provisions are self-executing when 
there is a manifest intention that they should go into 
immediate effect, and no ancillary legislation is 
necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the 
enforcement of a duty imposed* 12 C.J. 729, Section 106 ^  
A constitutional provision may be said to be self-
executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of 
which the right given may be enjoyed and protected or 
the duty imposed may be enforced; and it is not self-
executing when it merely indicates principles, without 
laying down rules by means of which those principles may 
be given the force of law. Cooley's Const.Lim. (8th 
Ed.) p. 1 6 7 . 
In referring to these principles, 16 C.J.S. Constitutional 
Law, Section 46 contains the following statements: 
The framers of a constitution may provide that some 
of its provisions be self-executing and where the matter 
with which a given section of the constitution deals is 
divisible, one clause thereof may be self-executing and 
the other clause or clauses may not be self-executing. 
Generally, a provision is self-executing when it can be 
given effect without the aid of legislation and there is 
nothing to indicate that legislation is contemplated in 
order to render it operative; otherwise stated, 
constitutional provisions are self-executing if they 
supply a sufficient rule for their implementation, or 
when there is a manifest intention that they should go 
into immediate effect, and no ancillary legislation is 
necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the 
enforcement of a duty imposed. 
• * * * 
[T]he legislature may neither abridge, extend, or 
otherwise alter a self-executing constitutional 
provision, and only such supplementary legislation is 
permissible as is in furtherance of the purpose, or as 
will facilitate the enforcement on operation of such 
provision, and legislation which will impair, limit, or 
destroy rights granted by the provision is not 
permi ssi ble. 
It is submitted that the tax exemption provisions of Article 
XIII, Section 2, supra, are self-executing and are effective 
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without any legislation, and that the legislature may neither 
expand or limit those tax e x e m p t i o n s . The former provision 
exempted property owned by "municipal corporations", and the 
present provision exempts property owned by "special d i s t r i c t s , 
and all other political subdivisions of the state." The property 
of the UTA is exempt from taxes under both provisions, and the 
legislature may not in any way modify, alter, amend or change 
that tax exemption, nor may they impose taxes on any portion of 
the property of UTA that is constitutionally exempt from t a x e s . 
The exemption is c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , not statutory, and the 
constitutional provision establishing the exemption is self-
executing and may not be tampered with by the legislature. 
C. SECTION 1 1 - 2 0 - 5 5 , UTAH CODE ANNOTATED DOES NOT PROVIDE 
FOR, OR REQUIRE, TAXATION OF THE UTA PROPERTY. 
Salt Lake County, in its brief, contends that Section 11-20-
55, Utah Code Annotated, 1 9 5 3 , as amended, requires that taxes be 
imposed on the UTA property which is the subject of this 
proceeding. The County takes the position that the UTA property 
is not directly connected with transportation purposes, and 
therefore the tax exemption does not apply. 
It is respectfully submitted that in taking those positions 
Salt Lake County, is in error both in its understanding of the 
facts and in its interpretation of the law. 
In taking the above position, the County does not take 
exception to the Findings and Conclusions of the Utah State Tax 
Commission in so far as they found and concluded that the Utah 
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Transit Authority is a public transit district organized pursuant 
to the provisions of the Utah Public Transit District Act, supra, 
and as such the UTA c o n s t i t u t e s a "special district 1 1 or "other 
political subdivision of the state" within the meaning of Article 
X I I I , Section 2 of the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , nor that there is a 
specific grant of a tax exemption by that constitutional 
provision* Since the County did not challenge the grant of a tax 
exemption on the forty (40) acres on which UTA has constructed 
buildings and other improvements, it is presumed that the County 
agrees that the tax exemption on the forty (40) acres is correct 
based upon the above findings and c o n c l u s i o n s . 
Section 1 1 - 2 0 - 5 5 , supra, p r o v i d e s : 
Title to all property acquired under the provisions of 
this act shall immediately and by operation of law vest 
in the transit d i s t r i c t , in it corporate name, and is 
hereby dedicated and set apart for the purposes set 
forth in this act and shall be exempt from all t a x a t i o n , 
including sales and use t a x e s , provided that such tax 
exemption shall not apply to property not used solely 
for transportation purposes or directly connected 
therew ith . (Emphasis added) 
The County takes the position that the forty (40) acres is 
"used solely for t r a n s p o r t a t i o n purposes" but the seventy (70) 
acres is not used solely for such p u r p o s e s . However, the County 
fails to interpret that statute in conjunction with the 
C o n s t i t u t i o n , and it also fails to consider the portion of the 
statute that states "or directly connected t h e r e w i t h . " 
In making its a r g u m e n t , the County is attempting to make an 
argument similar to that which was made in Duchesne County v. 
State Tax C o m m i s s i o n , 104 Utah 3 6 5 , 140 P.2d 3 3 5 . In that case, 
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the State Land Board had foreclosed on a mortgage on certain 
lands which had been part of the lands granted to the State of 
Utah by the United States by the Utah Constitution upon attaining 
Statehood. Duchesne County attempted to impose ad valorem taxes 
on the land held by the State of Utah, in a trust capacity for 
the school system, and Duchesne County claimed that the lands 
were held by the State in a propriety capacity and not in its 
governmental capacity* The issues in that case were stated by 
the Court as fol1ows : 
The Commission contends that under the provisions of 
Section 2 of Article 13, of the State Constitution, and 
of Section 8 0 - 2 - 1 , U.C.A. 1943 (R.S.U. 1 9 3 3 ) , the lands 
in question being property of the state, are exempt from 
t a x a t i o n . The county argues that the exemptions therein 
provided apply only to property which the state acquires 
and holds for the benefit of the public, that is, in its 
political or government capacity, and do not apply to 
property which the state acquires and holds as a result 
of an economic or business venture, or as an express 
trust for a specific purpose and not for the public 
generally that is, in what is generally called a private 
or proprietary capacity. The trial court upheld the 
County's c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
The Utah Supreme Court, however, in that case reversed the 
District Court and held that even though the funds within the 
trust fund were not held exclusively for th£ use of the state but 
would also benefit individual members of the public, 
nevertheless, the properties were still "property of this state" 
for purposes of the tax exemption provisions, and thus were 
exempt from ad valorem property t a x e s . 
The Court in the Duchesne County case, citing the South 
Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Board of Commissioners of Beadle 
County, 53 S.D. 609, 222 N.W. 5 8 2 , 586, stated: 
-15-
We therefore hold that there cannot be successfully 
mai ntai ned, as a matter of law, in this state, under the 
ci rcumstances here involved, a distinction between what 
has been frequently denominated as a 'sovereign" and 
1nonsovereign capacity of the state. (Emphasis added 
by the Court) 
The Utah Supreme Court then concluded: 
Since the constitution created the state solely for 
ciovernmental purposes, any right, duty or obligation it 
imposes upon the state, must ipso facto be a 
governmental o n e . Here the trusteeship of the fund was 
vested in the state by the Enabling Act as a condition 
of statehood, as a condition to the right of the state 
to be born, and imposed upon the state at its birth by 
the instrument of its creation as a condition of its 
life as a government. It must therefore be held by the 
state in a governmental capacity. It therefore comes 
within the constitutional exemption from taxation as 
property of the stated (Emphasis added) 
In the Duchesne County case, supra, Justices Wolfe, 
McDonough and Wade each wrote concurring opinions which are 
contained at pages 3 4 3 - 3 4 4 . Justice Wolfe stated: 
The basis of my concurrence is that 1 ands, title to 
which is acquired by the state by foreclosure of 
mortgage or conveyance for extinguishment of a debt for 
money loaned from the State School Fund, are exempt from 
taxation because they are within the meaning of the 
words ""property ***, of the State" as used in Sec 2 of 
Art. 13 of our Constitution." (Emphasis added) 
Justice McDonough stated: 
I concur in the order reversing the j u d g m e n t . I do so 
on the ground that the Constitution of the State of Utah 
provides that "the property *** of the state *** shall 
be exempt from taxation." Land, the title to which is 
acquired by the state, by foreclosure or grant, i s 
property of the state. The framers of the constitution 
did not expressly or by implication limit the exemption 
of state property to that acquired in any particular 
manner or for any particular purpose. Therefore, we 
need inquire no further, in determining the taxability 
of these lands, than to find whose property they a r e . 
Finding that they are the property of the state requires 
a declaration that they are exempt from t a x a t i o n . 
(Emphasis added) 
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Justice Wade stated: 
I concur in the result on the ground that this is the 
kind of property that was intended under our 
constitution and statutory provision to be exempt from 
taxation, it being held in trust for the benefit of the 
schools, and it is immaterial whether it is held in a 
governmental or proprietary capacity, and whether it was 
once subject to taxation or not. (Emphasis added) 
The case at hand is very similar to the Duchesne County 
c a s e . The Utah Constitution specifically exempts property of 
special districts and other political subdivisions of the state, 
and the UTA is certainly a special district and a political 
subdivision of the state and the lands owned by the UTA are 
exempt from ad valorem t a x e s , and that exemption may not be 
narrowed or broadened by the L e g i s l a t u r e . 
The County, in its brief, refers to the current Article 
XIII, Section 2, subsection (b) which provides as follows: 
(b) The property of c o u n t i e s , cities, towns, special 
d i s t r i c t s , and all other political subdivisions of the 
state, except that to the extent and in the manner 
provided by the Legislature the property of a county, 
city, town, special district or other political 
subdivision of the state outside of its geographic 
boundaries as defined by law may by subject to the ad 
valorem property t a x . (Emphasis added) 
The County refers to the above emphasized portion of the 
Constitution, and them on pp 3-4 of its brief it says, "By 
implication, it would seem logical that the legislature is also 
empowered to limited in other respects the exemption granted to 
these e n t i t i e s . Appellant urges this Court to find that this is 
precisely what the legislature did in enacting U.C.A. Section 11-
22 - 5 5 . However, it is respectfully submitted that to interpret 
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the above constitutional provision to give the powers to the 
legislature as suggested by Appellant would require twisted 
contortions of j u r i s p r u d e n c e p r i n c i p a l s . The Constitutional 
provision was carefully limited to permit one taxing entity to 
impose taxes on the property of another taxing entity when trie 
latter entity owns property that is located outside the 
geographic boundaries of the owning taxing entity. In the 
instant case, the geographic boundaries of UTA includes all of 
Salt Lake County (and numerous other areas) and the UTA owned 
property in question is located within Salt Lake County, which 
means that the UTA owned property is clearly within the 
geographic boundaries of the UTA. It is submitted that the 
purpose of that portion of the Utah Constitution was intended to 
take into consideration situations where a city, or other 
governmental entity, such as Bountiful City, which own a 
municipal power operation and constructs electric generation 
facilities outside its own geographical jurisdiction in another 
taxing district, such as Weber County. This provision of the 
Constitution was enacted to permit the taxation by Weber County 
of those types of facilities constructed by Bountiful City 
outside its geographic b o u n d a r i e s . This provision permits a 
governmental entity which must provide governmental services in 
the area in which those facilities have been constructed to have 
the tax base necessary to support the s e r v i c e s . To argue to this 
Court that the subparagraph (b) of Article XIII, Section 2 of the 
Utah Constitution permits the legislature to limit property tax 
exemptions in other ways is a gross distortion of the 
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constitutional provision. 
It is the position of the UTA that the legislature intended 
that all of the property of transit districts be exempt from 
taxation, irrespective of the use to whi<ph it is put. That 
position is sustained by the affidavits submitted by the chief 
Senate sponsor of Section 11-20-55 U.C.A., W. Hughes Brockbank, 
and by the chief House sponsor, Stanford P. Darger (R. 0064 to 
0 0 6 9 ) . Further, any legislation to the contrary would be 
unconstitutional . 
Therefore, it may be asked whether the UTA is challenging 
the constitutionality of U.C.A. Section 11-20-55? While the UTA 
does believe that the interpretation of that statue suggested by 
the County would render it unconstitutional, UTA is not at this 
time requesting a determination of its unconstitutionality. 
There are other ways of interpreting that statute and deciding 
this case without ruling that statute to be unconstitutional, and 
it is a maxim of constitutional interpretation that if a 
legislative enactment is subject to alternative interpretations 
and applications, one of which will render it constitutional and 
the other will render its constitutionality doubtful, the former 
should be chosen. Wagner v. Salt Lake City, 504 P.2d 1007, 29 
Utah 2d 4 2 , Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449 20 Utah 2d 
1 3 8 . In this case, the Court may uphold the constitutionality of 
the last portion of U.C.A. Section 11-20-55 by ruling in either 
of the following w a y s . 
First, by ruling that the UTA property in question (70 
acres) is "used solely for transportation purposes or directly 
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connected therewith." The property is, in fact, owned by UTA 
only for transportation purposes* The property has no other 
active or inactive use or purpose other than transportation 
p u r p o s e s . It was acquired to provide sufficient expansion room 
for when the UTA either expands its bus operation or commences 
the development of a high-speed light-rail system, or both. It 
was necessary to purchase the entire parcel of property at one 
time because of the absence of eminent domain powers by UTA. The 
road and sewer system have been installed with a view only to the 
future "transportation purpose" uses of the property. It is not 
uncommon for cities, c o u n t i e s , school districts, and other 
governmental entities to acquire vacant land and to hold that 
land for future expansion or development for uses as a park, 
school, or other governmental facilities, and it is well known 
that no property taxes are paid on those properties by the 
governmental entity between the date of acquisition and the date 
of d e v e l o p m e n t . Therefore, it is submitted that the land in 
question, in the absence of any other use, is being "used solely 
for transportation purposes or directly connected therewith" 
within the meaning of the statute, and the property is exempt 
from ad valorem taxes pursuant to the provisions of both the 
constitution and the s t a t u t e . 
Second, if the statute was truly intended to remove the tax 
exemption for property not used solely for transportation 
purposes, then taxation was intended only to the extent that it 
would be imposed by the privilege tax provisions of U.C.A. 
Section 5 9 - 1 3 - 7 3 , 74, 7b and 76 upon the person or entity using 
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the tax exempt property for any other purpose* 
property in question was not used by any other person 
for any other purpose, the privilege tax provisions do 
and the property remains exempt from taxes* 
POINT II 
PROPERTY OF ALL GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES 
INCLUDING TRANSIT DISTRICTS, IS PRESUMED TO 
BE EXEMPT FROM AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXES* 
Salt Lake County, in its brief, represents that exemptions 
from taxation are to be strictly construed and all presumptions 
must be against any such exemptions* The County cites as 
authority for that proposition Parker v * Quinn, 23 Utah 3 3 2 , 64 
Pac* 961, wherein it states, at page 964: 
The general rule is that all property of what kind 
soever and by whomsoever owned is subject to taxation; 
and when any kind of property is exempt it constitutes 
an exception to this rule* 
That statement of the law, is an accurate and correct 
statement of the law if the exemption being determined is being 
sought pursuant to the provision exempting property "used 
exclusively for, religious, charitable or educational purposes," 
because the status of the property is based upon the use of the 
property* (See also, Loyal Order of Moose #259 v» County Board 
of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d 2 5 7 , Yorgason v* 
County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, ex rel*, 
Episcapal Management Corporation, 714 P*2d 653, Utah County v» 
Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265, Salt Lake County v* Tax 
Since the 
or entity 
not apply 
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Commission of the State of Utah ex rel., Laborers Local N o . 295 
Building A s s o c i a t i o n , et al , 658 P.2d 1 1 9 4 ) * However, when the 
status of the property is based upon the ownership of the 
property such as for governmental entities (including special 
districts) the presumption is just the opposite, i.e., it is 
presumed that all real property owned by any governmental entity 
or public body is exempt from ad valorem property t a x e s . This 
principal is well stated by 71 Am Jur 2d, State and Local 
Taxation, Section 3 3 6 , where it states: 
When public property is involved, exemption is the rule 
and taxation the e x c e p t i o n . Certainly, the rule of 
strict construction may not be invoked against a 
municipality asserting an exemption. Public property is 
presumed to be exempt from the operation of general 
property tax l a w s . Tax statutes are construed not to 
embrace property of the government or its 
'instrumentalities unless the legislative 'intention to 
include such property is plainly and clearly e x p r e s s e d . 
(Emphasis added) 
This general statement of the law is in fact the exact 
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in City of Springville v s . 
Johnson, supra, and the Court therein expressed it as follows: 
The only question in the case is whether the real estate 
owned by the plaintiff, and described in the complaint, 
was liable to taxation for county, school, and 
territorial purposes in 1 8 9 2 . By legal implication and 
by express statute, it was so exempt. By a general 
provision the revenue law professes to make all property 
within the territory t a x a b l e . Even in the absence of 
any express e x e m p t i o n s , it is settled by the authorities 
that the property of a municipal corporation could not 
be subject to taxation under such general provision. It 
is a principle of interpretation of statutes that they 
do not apply to the sovereign, unless named. The state 
is sovereign, and all public corporations partake of 
sovereignty, and the rules exempting sovereigns apply to 
such corporations . . . In Van Brocklin v. State of 
T e n n e s s e e , 117 U . S . 1 5 1 , 173.6 Sup. Ct. 6 7 0 , the court 
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uses this language: "General tax acts of a state are 
never, without the clearest words, held to include its 
own property or that of its municipal corporations, 
although not in terms exempt from taxation* (Emphasis 
added) 
The court then concluded with the statement: 
The exemption is absolute, and depends upon no condition 
but ownership by the city!" (Emphasis added) 
Therefore, while the general presumption is that all 
property is subject to taxes, when the property is owned by a 
governmental entity or public body, the presumption is that the 
property is exempt from all t a x e s . 
This presumption was stated by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania in a case involving the tax exemption of property 
held by their State Employees Retirement System. In Commonwealth 
vs. Dauphin County, et. al ., 6 A. 2d 870, 335 Pa, 1 7 7 , the Court 
said: 
The ordinary presumption against exemption does not 
apply where the property involved is owned by the 
Commonwealth, since such property has for reasons of 
public policy been consistently recognized as free from 
taxation. See Mattern v. Canevin, 213 Pa. 588, 590, 63 
A. 1 3 1 . The construction in such cases should always be 
in favor of the Commonwealth! (Emphasis added) 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that in the absence 
of a statute expressly imposing taxes upon the properties of the 
UTA, those properties should be presumed to be exempt from ad 
valorem property t a x e s . 
CONCLUSION 
In addition to being a special district as that term is used 
in the Utah Constitution, the UTA also believes that its 
properties would constitute "Property owned by a nonprofit entity 
which is used exclusively for . . . charitable • . . purposes" 
and is also exempt under that provision of Article XIII, Section 
2 of the Utah Constitution, because such a small portion of the 
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actual cost of a bus ride is paid by the passengers and the 
balance is paid by Federal Grant and tax subsidy. However, since 
specific evidence on that issue was not submitted at the hearing, 
and since the Tax Commission did not make specific findings 
regarding the charitable nature of the UTA those exemption issues 
have not been addressed in this brief. 
The Utah State Tax Commission did determine that the Utah 
Transit Authority is a Public Transit District under the Utah 
Public Transit District Act and a special district under Article 
XIII Section 2 of the Utah Constitution, and that the properties 
of UTA are, therefore, exempt from ad valorem taxes by the Utah 
Constitution, without the necessity of looking at the statutes or 
the use of the property. The ruling of the Tax Commission was 
correct and should be affirmed by this Court. 
:tful ly submitted th ay of July, 1 9 8 6 . Respec 
r^  
G. B l a i n e Dav is 
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